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ABSTRACT  
 
 The works in this document illustrate the difficulties in implementing measures 
based on the Anglo American model to improve corporate governance in four 
Asian countries; Korea, China, Malaysia and Japan. The evidence shows that 
corporate governance transformations in these countries have brought about 
conflict between newly adopted governance mechanisms and the existing 
domestic environment. I argue that attempts to improve corporate governance 
through adopting models from foreign jurisdictions cause enormous 
complications, and that their adoption is often prompted by a flawed belief that 
they will naturally bring about order to corporate governance in the host 
country.  
 The works in this document also explore the impact of transplanting Anglo 
American employment practices (an important constituent of the Anglo 
American corporate governance model) on employment relations in Asian 
countries. Employment relationships in these countries, traditionally 
characterised by norms of life long employment, promotion and remuneration 
based on seniority and strong ‗familial‘ relations between employers and 
workers, are increasingly being undermined by Anglo American employment 
practices which promote certain forms of labour flexibility, erode trust between 
employer and workers and encourage increasing reliance on formal legal rights 
to protect interests. I conclude that Asian countries need to ensure that laws and 
practices which are adopted to advance corporate success are appropriate for 
their domestic environments. 
The works in this document contribute to the study of corporate governance in 
three ways. First, it contributes to an understanding of the problems and 
practicalities in implementing the Anglo American model across different 
national systems. Second, it contributes to the growing literature on this subject 
in Asian countries, a significant area of growth in the world economy. Third, it 
generates ideas which may be useful in instigating empirical research to 
investigate further impacts on Asian corporate governance of the adoption of 
foreign models.  
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TRANSPLANTING THE ANGLO AMERICAN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE MODEL INTO ASIAN COUNTRIES: 
PROSPECTS AND PRACTICALITY 
 
 INTRODUCTION  
 The Anglo American corporate governance model is generally regarded in 
American management literature as optimal. Its corporate governance 
structures, shareholder friendly laws and active capital markets with high levels 
of disclosure are regarded as mechanisms which can putatively enable ‗global‘ 
standards of efficiency, accountability and transparency to be achieved. The 
reasons for its superiority being asserted have been attributed to US and UK 
economic imperialism and consequently, the leading role they have played in 
framing corporate governance best practices.
1
 Many countries outside of the 
US and UK are strongly encouraged by the international financial community 
to emulate this model as a means of attracting business.
2
  
 
 The literature discussing whether national corporate governance systems will 
ultimately converge towards the Anglo American model is voluminous. 
Convergence theorists argue that convergence is inevitable for various reasons; 
firstly, that globalisation is reducing the diversity in corporate governance 
                                                 
1
 In the early 1990s, corporate governance debate centred on how the US could 
improve its economic success through adopting governance mechanisms from 
other jurisdictions, such as Germany and Japan. By the mid to late 1990s, 
however, with the US economy prosperous and the ‗globalisation‘ debate 
taking centre stage, the direction of the debate changed to how other countries 
could emulate its model in order to recreate its successes. See J Hill, ―The 
Persistent Debate about Convergence in Comparative Corporate Governance‖ 
(2005) Sydney Law Review 27, 743 – 752.  
2
 On pressures on Asian countries to do so, see HJ Chang, ―Globalisation, 
Global Standards and the Future of East Asia‖ (2005), Global Economic 
Review, 34, 4, 363 – 378, S Soederberg, ―The Promotion of Anglo American 
Corporate Governance in the South: Who Benefits from the New International 
Standard?‖ (2003), Third World Quarterly, 24, 1, 7 – 27, PK Liew, ―Corporate 
Governance Reforms in Malaysia: the key leading players‘ perspectives‖, 
(2007), Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15, 5, 724 – 740, J 
Glen & A Singh, ―Corporate Governance, Competition and Finance: Re-
thinking Lessons from the Asian Crisis‖, (2005), Eastern Economic Journal, 
31, 2, 219 – 243.  
    
 7 
practices across countries by forcing them to align their governance structures 
with the most desirable model. Secondly, the expansion by increasingly 
powerful US-based multinationals of their businesses into host countries is 
causing local companies to shake free from their customs and traditions, to 
evolve toward the Anglo American model of governance and operation. Last 
but not least, such esteem is accorded to the Anglo American model by global 
investors and markets that companies outside of the US and UK have 
succumbed to pressures to adopt this model.
3
  
 
 Others however, have strongly opposed the convergence theory, arguing that 
factors such as culture, legal systems, individual social and political histories 
and institutional ‗path dependence‘4 are preventing convergence from taking 
place.
5
 These scholars posit that different national environments influence 
companies in different ways in the formulation of strategies to compete in the 
global economy. Moreover, foreign based multinationals seek legitimacy in  
                                                 
3
 See for example, H Hansmann & R Kraakman, ―The End of History for 
Corporate Law‖, (2001), Georgetown Law Journal, 89, 439 – 468, RJ Gilson 
―Globalising Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function‖ 
(2001), American Journal of Comparative Law, 49, 2, 329 – 357, J Coffee, 
―The Future as History: The Prospect for Global Convergence in Corporate 
Governance and its Implications‖ (1999), Northwestern University Law 
Review, 93, 3, 641 – 707, C Jordan, ―The Conundrum of Corporate 
Governance‖, (2005), Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 30, 983 – 1027, 
A Dignam and M Galanis, ―Corporate Governance and the Importance of 
Macroeconomic Context‖ (2008) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 28, 2, 201 – 
243. 
4
 ‗Path dependence‘ refers to the idea that institutions evolve only very 
gradually over time, and that only minor deviations from the path are likely. 
5
 See for example, the works of S Jacoby, ―Corporate Governance in 
Comparative Perspective: Prospects for Convergence‖, (2000) Comparative 
Labor Law and Policy Journal, 22, 5, 5 – 32, JN Gordon & MJ Roe (eds), 
Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance, (2004), (Cambridge 
University Press, UK), DM Branson ―The Very Uncertain Prospects of Global 
Convergence in Corporate Governance‖ (2001), Cornell International Law 
Journal, 34, 321 – 362, M Guillen, ―Corporate Governance and Globalisation: 
Is there Convergence across Countries?‖ (2000) Advances in International 
Comparative Management, 13, 175 – 204, TA Parades, ―A Systems Approach 
to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing US Corporate Law isn‘t the 
Answer‖ (2004) William and Mary Law Review, 45, 1055 – 1158, U Braendle 
& J Noll, ―On the Convergence of National Corporate Governance Systems‖ 
(2006) Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 17, 57 – 81. 
 8 
 host countries and themselves adapt strongly to the environments in these 
countries, thus ‗hybridising‘ their practices.  In Germany, where considerable 
emphasis is traditionally given to co-operative relations between stakeholders 
and worker protection and welfare, the participation of labour in supervisory 
boards is still a key corporate governance feature. In France, Italy, Switzerland, 
Austria, and also in Germany, where banks and regional government are also 
core players in companies, they have not relinquished their role in corporate 
governance, despite the rapid growth of capital markets in these countries. In 
Japan and South Korea, where cultural collectivism and Confucian values 
dominate, companies organise themselves in such a manner as to provide 
security and stability for each other.
6
 The adoption of foreign governance 
models may disrupt the equilibrium and the delicate interdependence between 
original models of governance and other national elements. Countries which do 
so may experience loss of efficiency, destabilisation and inconsistency.
7
 In 
other words, a definite evolution toward one model of corporate governance is 
very questionable. 
 
 The works in this synoptic document have subscribed neither to the 
‗convergence‘ nor the ‗path dependence‘ argument. They simply illustrate the 
difficulties in implementing measures based on the Anglo American model to 
improve corporate governance in countries with fundamentally different 
backgrounds. As will be explained below, many emerging Asian economies 
have fashioned their laws and practices on the Anglo American model in order 
to attract business and investment. Many also do so in the belief that these laws 
and practices can improve corporate governance in their companies. But 
                                                 
6
 M Guillen, (2000), pp. 227 – 229 
7
 See P Hall & D Soskice, (eds.): Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage, (2001), (Oxford: OUP) who use the 
term ‗institutional complementarities‘ to describe the interdependent and 
mutually supporting nature of a collection of institutional arrangements which 
together, not only enable comparative advantages for firms, but also steer their 
performance and economic development in a particular direction. Disruption of 
one institution disturbs the equilibrium and causes loss of efficiency. See also 
L Bebchuk & M Roe, ―A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate 
Governance and Ownership‖ (1999), Stanford Law Review, 52, 127 – 170 and 
R Schmidt & G Spindler, ―Path Dependence, Corporate Governance and 
Complementarity, (2002), International Finance, 5, 3, 311 – 333. 
 9 
corporate governance transformations in these countries have brought about 
conflict between newly adopted governance mechanisms and existing national 
elements. Many of the latter are deeply historically derived and embedded; 
they cannot be easily reconciled with the Anglo American model. I show 
across the works submitted here how corporate governance developments 
through adopting models from foreign jurisdictions cause enormous 
complications. I conclude that it is misguided to argue that the adoption of 
foreign governance models will naturally bring about order to corporate 
governance in host countries, without exploring how transplantation interacts 
with existing local environments.  
 
 The works in Part A of this document concentrated on the issues associated 
with and actual prospects of transplanting the Anglo American corporate 
governance model into Asian countries. It also investigated the possibility of 
whether Asian countries can construct corporate governance models more 
suited to their economic, social, and political conditions. The works in Part B 
explored the impact of transplanting Anglo American employment practices 
(an important constituent of the Anglo American corporate governance model) 
on the employment relationship in Asian countries. The topic has special 
significance in Asia because employment relationships in many of these 
countries have frequently been characterised by norms of life long employment, 
promotion and remuneration based on seniority and strong ‗familial‘ relations 
between employers and workers. Although ‗employment relations‘ is a 
discipline in its own right, I investigate it in the context of corporate 
governance because the subject gives meaning to the way companies are 
organised and managed. The works in Part B demonstrated that employment 
relationships in Asian countries are increasingly undermined by policies based 
on Anglo American practices which promote certain forms of labour flexibility 
by legalising lays offs and mass redundancies, cause existing levels of trust 
between employer and workers to decline and encourage increasing reliance on 
formal legal rights to protect individual and collective interests.  
 
 
 
 10 
 OVERALL CONTRIBUTION OF WORKS 
The works in this document contribute to the study of corporate governance in 
three important ways. First, and most obviously, they make a critical 
contribution to an understanding of the problems and practicalities in 
implementing Anglo American corporate governance across different national 
systems. Second, they contribute to the limited but growing literature on this 
subject in Asian countries, a significant area of growth in the world economy. 
This topic has only recently received attention in western corporate governance 
literature, despite the increasing importance these countries are playing in 
global trade. I present an overview of corporate governance developments in 
four Asian countries, demonstrate why difficulties in transplantation have 
arisen and emphasise the conflict between foreign models and existing 
environments. I also show the importance of blending employment practices 
with national institutions in order to find the most appropriate regime for 
advancing corporate success. Third, the works generate ideas which may be 
useful in instigating empirical research to investigate further impacts on Asian 
corporate governance of the adoption of foreign models. They complement a 
wide range of existing research which investigates how corporate governance 
can be improved in Asian countries.  
 
THE EVOLUTION OF MY THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 
The transplantation issue may be approached from three perspectives – 
‗culturalist‘ ‗institutional‘ and ‗political/historical‘ perspectives. My approach 
initially concentrated on the influence of culture on corporate governance 
models. The ‗culturalist‘ perspective argues that cultural values are central 
elements which shape corporate governance development. Importantly, unless 
corporate governance mechanisms are compatible with the cultural traits of the 
host country, such mechanisms will be ineffective in promoting good 
management and advancing corporate success. Culture is taken to mean the 
deeply embedded and resilient values, beliefs, goals and ‗ways of life‘ which 
are held in common among the members of a particular society and which are 
passed along from one generation to the next. The influential Dutch expert, 
Geert Hofstede, who investigated the relationship between national cultures 
 11 
and organisational cultures defines ‗culture‘ as the ‗collective programming of 
the mind that distinguishes the members of one human group from those of 
another‘. In other words, ‗culture‘ is synonymous with a system of collectively 
held values.
8
 Indeed, there is a wide body of recent research on the effect of 
national culture on corporate governance development, and which stresses its 
importance in cross country research.
9
 I have gradually however, recognised 
the significance of the ‗institutional‘ and ‗political/historical‘ perspectives as 
alternative ways of understanding the difficulties experienced when 
transplanting foreign governance models. 
 
The ‗institutionalist‘ perspective is a strand of discussion which argues that it 
is institutions, rather than culture, which determine the nature of corporate 
governance models. The ‗culturalist‘ and ‗institutionalist‘ approaches may be 
                                                 
8
 Hofstede attributed five dimensions to a country‘s cultural attitudes – power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism v collectivism, masculinity v 
femininity and time orientation. See < http://www.geert-hofstede.com/ >. 
Some of his works exploring cultural differences and their impact on work 
values in the work place include G Hofstede, Culture's Consequences, 
Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations, 
(2001), (Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications) and G Hofstede & GJ 
Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, (2004), (New 
York: McGraw-Hill USA). 
9
 For discussions and case studies on the relationship between culture and 
corporate governance, see A Licht, ―The Mother of All Path Dependencies: 
Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems‖ (2001), 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 26, 1,147 – 205, A Licht, C Goldschmidt 
& S Schwartz, ―Culture, Law, and Corporate Governance‖, (2005), International 
Review of Law and Economics, 25, 229 – 255, A Licht, ―Legal Plug-Ins: Cultural 
Distance, Cross-Listing, and Corporate Governance Reform‖, (2004), Berkeley 
Journal of International Law, 22, 2, 195 – 239, BS Tabalujan, ―Why Indonesian 
Corporate Governance Failed - Conjectures Concerning Legal Culture‖ (2002), 
Columbia Journal of Asian Law, 15, 2, 141 – 171, RM Haniffa & TE Cooke, 
―Culture, Corporate Governance and Disclosure in Malaysian Corporations‖ 
(2002), Abacus, 38, 3, 317 – 349, JT Li & JR Harrison, ―National Culture and 
the Composition and Leadership Structure of Boards of Directors‖ (2008), 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16, 5, 375 – 385, T Walker & 
K Pukthuanthong, ―Venture Capital in China: A Culture Shock for Western 
Investors‖ (2007), Management Decision, 45, 4, 708 – 731, R Dimo & Z 
Maurizio, ―The impact of national culture on corporate social performance‖ 
(2007), Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Effective Board 
Performance, 7, 4, 476 – 485, W Qu & P Leung, ―Cultural Impact on Chinese 
corporate disclosure? A Corporate Governance Perspective,‖ (2006), Managerial 
Auditing Journal, 21, 3, 241 – 264. 
 12 
complementary rather than mutually exclusive, but that is not my subject here. 
The ‗institutionalist‘ approach assumes that the institutional environment in 
which an organisation operates strongly influences its policies and practices. 
Institutions guide, regulate, constrain and interact with the behaviour of 
organisations. There is no universally accepted definition of ‗institutions‘ for 
the purposes of the theory. They have been used in the ‗formal‘ sense; for 
example, in referring to frameworks of laws or legal regulations. They have 
also been regarded as ‗organisational‘; that is, organisations such as 
employers‘ associations and trade unions. Finally, they have been used in an 
‗informal‘ sense, referring to norms of behaviour, customs and conventions.10  
 
Institutional theorists argue that organisations choose a particular form of 
structure or set of practices either because they would receive legitimacy 
within the national environment, or because there is little reason to undertake 
disruptive change in existing host-country arrangements. Institutions do not 
operate individually, but rather are linked together in systems of 
‗complementarities‘.  Institutional configurations differ very markedly across 
countries. They also evolve, albeit gradually. This gradual change is ‗path 
dependency‘, meaning that only minor changes and excursions from the 
historical ‗path‘ are likely as institutional configurations adapt to the 
environment. Viewed from the perspective of ‗institutionalist‘ theory, the  
                                                 
10
 Seminal works on institutional theory in their various contexts include D 
North, Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance, (1990), 
(New York: Cambridge University Press), WR Scott, Institutions and 
Organizations, 2
nd
 edition, (2001), (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage), R Whitley, 
Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business 
Systems, (2000), (Oxford: OUP), G Morgan, R Whitley & E Moen, Changing 
Capitalisms? Internationalisation, Institutional Change and Systems of 
Economic Organisation, (2005), (Oxford: OUP), P Hall & D Soskice, (eds). 
Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative 
Advantage, (2001), (Oxford: OUP), W Powell & P DiMaggio (eds.), The New 
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, (1991), (Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press), P DiMaggio & W Powell ―The Iron Cage Revisited: 
Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields,‖ 
(1983), American Sociological Review, 48, 2, 147 – 160, B Amable, The 
Diversity of Modern Capitalism, (2003), (Oxford: OUP), LG Zucker, 
―Institutional Theories of Organisation‖ (1987) Annual Review of Sociology, 
13, 443 – 464.   
 13 
reason why many transplantation initiatives have failed in Asian countries is 
because their governments have adopted governance models which are 
inconsistent with their domestic institutions. 
 
The ‗institutionalist‘ perspective regards corporate governance as part of, and 
as structured by, a country‘s institutional framework. Hence, the unique 
institutional arrangement which affect corporate governance practices need to 
be fully understood. So for example, whether shareholding in companies is 
dispersed or concentrated is influenced by institutional arrangements such as 
the extent to which the law protects shareholders from expropriation by 
company directors and controlling shareholders.
11
 Similarly, the extent to 
which institutional shareholders such as private pension funds involve 
themselves in corporate governance depends on the welfare arrangements and 
pension provision in their countries. Where the latter are generous and widely 
available, it is likely that private pension funds will play a lesser role in 
corporate governance because they will have lower resources. Last but not 
least, the capacities of banks and financial institutions to engage in long-term 
relationships with companies depend strongly on national capital market 
structures, such as whether or not there are active capital markets which can 
generate capital quickly and easily for companies.  
 
In one of my recent works, I adopted an ‗institutionalist‘ perspective on the 
development of labour management practices (R Croucher & L Miles, ―The 
Legal Structuring of Women's Collective Voice in the South Korean 
Workplace‖ (2009) Journal of Contemporary Asia, 39, 2, 231 – 246). In this 
work, the limitations inherent in the Korean legal framework are examined to 
explain the reduced possibilities for women to address their problems in the 
                                                 
11
 Works by F Lopez-de-Silanes, R La Porta, A Shleifer & R Vishny, ―Investor 
Protection and Corporate Governance‖, (2000), Journal of Financial 
Economics, 58, 1, 3 – 27 and F Lopez-de-Silanes, R La Porta & A Shleifer, 
―Corporate Ownership Around the World‖ (1999), Journal of Finance, 54, 2, 
471 – 517, for example, suggest that companies in countries in which 
shareholders enjoy strong legal protection from expropriation by the managers 
and controlling shareholders of companies tend to have widely held 
shareholding, conversely, where shareholder protection is poor, companies are 
typically tightly held.   
 14 
workplace. Despite the government introducing a range of legislation to rectify 
the situation, this has had limited impact on employers‘ practices. Although 
these laws could be positively complemented by other legislation to ensure that 
women have a collective voice at work, this has not taken place, reducing the 
possibilities for women to address their own problems directly.  
 
The theoretical strand which I label ‗political/historical‘ argues that the 
operation and structure of individual companies is strongly influenced by 
different political systems. Political factors shape the path taken by companies 
in the development of their corporate governance regimes, including how 
companies are regulated, the nature of the relationship between the different 
organs in the company and the kinds of shareholding structures which exist. 
Roe,
12
 a pioneer of this perspective, (focusing only on the US, the larger 
continental Europe countries and Japan) argues that political forces account for 
the difference in choice of corporate governance models. The reason for the 
variety of corporate governance models which exist today is political 
environments and the correlation between the two is argued to be powerful. 
Political forces, such as party systems, political institutions, the orientations of 
individual governments and ideologies determine the extent to which 
shareholding is dispersed and the way key players within the company interact 
with each other.
13
 For example, strong social democracies
14
 (Germany, France, 
Italy) are often linked with weak shareholder rights and ownership dispersion 
because in such societies, directors look beyond profit maximisation for 
                                                 
12
 MJ Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance, (2003), (New 
York: OUP), MJ Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of 
American Corporate Finance, (1994), (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
13
 For an argument that the differences in political institutions among these 
countries may account for much of the variations in Asian corporate 
governance, see X Wu, ―Political Institutions and Corporate Governance 
Reforms in Southeast Asia‖ in KL Ho, (ed.) Reforming Corporate Governance 
In Southeast Asia: Economics, Politics And Regulations, (2005), (Institute of 
Southeast Asia Studies (ISEAS) Publications, Singapore), 16 – 37.  
14
 In these countries, governments aim to reform capitalism democratically 
through state regulation and implementation of policies which ameliorate the 
social injustice and inefficiencies associated with capitalist economies. 
 15 
shareholders.
15
 Such societies expect directors to cooperate with employees 
rather than focus solely on shareholders. If the latter wished to ensure that their 
interests are looked after, then the best way to achieve this is to ensure that 
their shareholding is concentrated. This explains why such economies have 
developed corporate governance mechanisms to mitigate the problems created 
by concentrated shareholding. By way of contrast, the US has had one of the 
world‘s weakest social democratic influences (as a result of its specific 
historical evolution), and the company has been able to flourish in a relatively 
laissez faire environment. Large companies were managed by powerful 
directors with dispersed and distant shareholders. Banks and other financial 
institutions were not, under the political environment, granted the right to hold 
significant amounts of equity to control directors – in fact, they were 
deliberately fragmented for fear that they would gain too much power. Where 
social democracy is weak, ownership dispersion could proliferate. This also 
explains the nature of laws enacted to address perceived agency problems in 
US companies.
16
 
 
All three approaches have some utility when investigating the subject of 
transplantation and I have drawn on each when examining the appropriateness 
of transplanting the Anglo American corporate governance model in order to 
enhance corporate governance standards in the following countries: Korea, 
China, Malaysia and Japan.  
 
 
                                                 
15
 M Belloc & U Pagano, ―Co Evolution of Politics and Corporate 
Governance‖ (2006), available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=729725> 
16
 See also P Gourevitch & J Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control: 
The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance, (2005), (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press) who similarly introduce a political element to 
explain or interpret corporate governance. The authors argue that certain 
political environments encourage policies that promote dispersed shareholding, 
while others give rise to concentrated shareholding. Further, in G Miller, 
―Political Structure and Corporate Governance: Some Points of Contrast 
between the United States and England‖ (1998), at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=110515>, the author 
argues that different political systems give rise to different rules on takeovers 
and derivative actions. 
 16 
  THE ANGLO AMERICAN MODEL: AN OPTIMAL MODEL? 
The Anglo American corporate governance model, based on normative ‗free 
market‘ principles, relies on various pre-requisites for its successful operation 
– entrepreneurship, free allocation of resources, free trade, competition and self 
regulation with minimal governmental intervention. The focus of corporate 
governance is on the relationship between the board of directors and 
shareholders. The company is managed by a board of directors (in agency 
theory, the agent), nominally appointed by, and responsible to, shareholders (in 
the same theory, the principal). However, as shareholding in Anglo American 
jurisdictions is typically dispersed, shareholders are ineffective in controlling 
the board. Indeed, in their pioneering 1932 work, Berle and Means
17
 created 
the now well-known ‗agency theory‘ and warned of the concentration of power 
brought about by the rise of the large companies and the emergence of a 
powerful class of professional directors. Where shareholding is widely 
dispersed, the typical shareholder is unable to influence the management of the 
company. The result is that those who can, i.e. directors, have the ability to 
manage it to their own advantage. They may do it in a way to further their own 
interests, divert the assets of the company to themselves and disregard the 
interests of minority shareholders. Unless shareholders possess sufficient 
shareholdings in the company, they are unable to discipline and monitor 
directors. The resulting agency problems, including the financial costs, are a 
major concern to American corporate governance scholars.  
 
To mitigate these problems, various mechanisms are adopted under the Anglo 
American governance model to align the interests of directors with those of 
shareholders. Firstly, independent directors are considered an important aspect 
of corporate governance control, as they can act as the eyes and ears of 
shareholders and bring an element of objectivity to internal company 
discussions. Secondly, the law typically imposes on directors various duties to 
the company, penalising them when they fail to carry out this duty.
18
 In 
                                                 
17
 The Modern Corporation and Private Property, (1932), (New Brunswick: 
NJ, 1997, originally published in 1932). 
18
 Examples of duties include duties to act in the best interests of the company, 
exercise their powers for a proper purpose, act with reasonable care and skill 
 17 
addition, the presence of active capital markets continually exposes companies 
to the prospect of takeovers – providing a strong incentive for directors to 
manage the company diligently lest they lose their jobs. Further, shareholders 
are given the power to commence legal actions against the board in the event 
of breach of duty. The laws which regulate the legal relationship between 
directors and their companies and between directors and shareholders are 
highly developed. American corporate culture is also litigious. Where a dispute 
arises, parties invoke their legal rights and resort to litigation in order to obtain 
a remedy. Last but not least, the media, industry and the legal and accountancy 
professions all undertake an active role in setting appropriate standards for 
directorial conduct.
19
  
 
(1) KOREA’S (CONFUCIAN) CULTURAL CONSTRAINTS 
A large volume of literature exists which discusses the nature of economic 
measures adopted by the Korean government to spur national growth since the 
1960s, as well as the subsequent devastating effect of the 1997 financial crisis  
on its economy.
 20
 I singled out the effects of the crisis on the corporate sector 
for discussion, because I wanted to demonstrate firstly, how business was 
                                                                                                                                
and avoid a conflict of interest and duty. For cases in the UK in relation to 
these duties (which have been codified in statute), see Re Smith Fawcett [1942] 
Ch 304, Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum [1974] AC 821, Aberdeen Railway 
v Blaikie Bros [1854] 1 Macq 461, Regal Hastings v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134, 
IDC v Cooley [1972] 1 WLR 443, Re Barings plc (No 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433. 
These are today codified in the Companies Act 2006, ss. 171 – 178. 
19
 For a discussion of the essential characteristics of Anglo American corporate 
governance (also known as ‗outsider‘ or ‗market based‘ or ‗shareholder‘ 
model), see T Clarke, ―Anglo American Corporate Governance‖ in T. Clarke, 
International Corporate Governance: A Comparative Approach, (2007), 
(Routledge: Oxford), 129 – 169, and J Solomon, Corporate Governance and 
Accountability, 2
nd
 ed., (2007), (John Wiley & Sons), 179 – 198. 
20
 See, as a sample, A Amsden, Asia’s next giant: South Korea and Late 
Industrialization, (1989), (New York: OUP), TY Kong, The Politics of 
Economic Reform in South Korea: A Fragile Miracle, (2000), (Routledge: 
New York), JG Kim, ―The Next Stage of Reforms: Korean Corporate 
Governance in the Post Asian Financial Crisis Era‖ (2006) Asian Journal of 
Comparative Law 1, 1, 44 – 67, HC Lim & JH Jang, ―Neo Liberalism in Post 
Crisis South Korea: Social Conditions and Outcomes‖ (2006), Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, 36, 4, 442 – 463, JM Cho & JH Keum, ―Job Instability in 
the Korean Labour Market: Estimating the Effects of the 1997 Financial 
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organised before the 1997 financial crisis and how this changed post-1997. 
Secondly, I wished to illustrate the difficulties experienced in improving 
corporate governance because reform measures clashed with various cultural 
aspects of Korean society.  
 
REFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN KOREA 
POST 1997 
No meaningful discussion of corporate governance in Korea can take place 
without the reader being familiar with the large conglomerates which were 
once the backbone of the Korean economy. Indeed, many attribute Korea‘s 
remarkable growth after two devastating wars to the dynamics between the 
government and these conglomerates. Based on a state led development model, 
the Korean government exercised full and direct control over the country‘s 
economy and social institutions. In pursuing high growth, it selected a small 
number of big businesses to carry out its developmental plans in return for 
privileges such as low interest credits and monopolistic licenses. These 
developed into the Korean chaebols as we know them today. I describe how 
these chaebols function in my works (L Miles ―Transferring the Anglo 
American System to South Korea: At What Cost and Are there Alternatives?‖ 
(2008), Bond Law Review, 20, 2, 71 – 91, L Miles, ―The Cultural Aspects of 
Corporate Governance Reform in South Korea‖, (2007), Journal of Business 
Law, 51, 8, 851 – 867 and L Miles, ―The Application of Anglo American 
corporate practices in societies influenced by Confucian values‖ (2006), 
Business and Society Review, 111, 3, 305 – 322). I emphasise the point that 
                                                                                                                                
Crisis‖ (2004), International Labour Review, 143, 4, 373 – 392, JY Koo & SL 
Kiser, ―Recovery from a Financial Crisis: The Case of South Korea‖ (2001), 
Economic and Financial Review, 4, 24 – 36, J Crotty & KK Lee, ―Economic 
Performance in Post Crisis Korea: A Critical Perspective on Neo liberal 
Restructuring‖ (2001), Seoul Journal of Economics, 14, 2, 183 – 242, EH Kim 
& WC Kim, ―Changes in Korean Corporate Governance: A Response to 
Crisis‖ (2008), Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 20, 1, 47 – 58, JW Lee 
& CY Rhee, ―Crisis and Recovery: What We have learned from the South 
Korean Experience‖ (2007), Asian Economic Policy Review, 2, 1, 146 – 164, 
JS Shin & HJ Chang, ―Economic Reform after the Financial Crisis: A Critical 
Assessment of Institutional Transition and Transition Costs in South Korea‖ 
(2005), Review of International Political Economy, 12, 3, 409 – 433, HJ Chang 
& JS Shin, ―Evaluating the Post Crisis Corporate Restructuring in Korea‖ 
(2002), Seoul Journal of Economics, 15, 2, 245 – 276. 
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chaebols are organised around Confucian principles.
21
 They are typically 
founded by one individual, who retained control over them and who passed 
this control to the eldest son upon his retirement or demise. Their social 
relations normatively resemble a family, where the employer is regarded as a 
parent who looks after workers and their families. Management within the 
chaebols is autocratic and dictatorial, with the influence of the founder 
apparent in how they are led. Decision making is often centralised. In-group 
harmony, identity with the firm logo and loyalty to employers are 
characteristics typical of workers, who in turn are rewarded and promoted on 
the basis of their seniority. These Confucian ethics are said to be responsible 
for Korea‘s rapid economic growth.22  
 
After the Korean government started to pursue economic liberalisation policies 
in the 1980s, it also started to loosen its hold over the chaebols and they were 
allowed to expand freely. They pursued ambitious expansions that often lacked 
economic justification. Their practice of cross-shareholding, debt guarantees 
and vertical integration resulted in extensive networks which prevented them 
from disposing of unprofitable businesses. Yet, instead of addressing these 
fundamental problems, the government simply extended funds to them in order 
to prop them up.
23
 Their subsequent collapse (after the 1997 Asian financial 
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 Particularly helpful resources explaining the power of Confucian doctrine in 
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Asian Context, (2006), (Princeton: Princeton University Press) and D Bell, 
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(Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
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growth, see, as a sample, OY Kwon, ―A Cultural Analysis of South Korea‘s 
economic prospects‖, (2005), Global Economic Review, 34, 2, 213 – 231, TK 
Park, ―Confucian Values and Contemporary Economic Development in Korea‖ 
in T Brook & HV Luong (eds.) Culture and Economy: The Shaping of 
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South Korea‖, (2003), Journal of Contemporary Asia, 33, 1, 37 – 49. 
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 A valuable discussion of the history of chaebols may be found in SJ Chang, 
Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business Groups: The Rise 
and Fall of Chaebols, (2003), (Cambridge University Press, UK). 
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crisis) brought about catastrophic consequences for the Korean economy. As a 
condition for bailing the Korean economy out, the IMF, to which the 
government appealed for aid, imposed several conditions, one of which was 
that its companies had to be restructured along the lines of the Anglo American 
model.
24
  
 
The literature discussing economic reform in Korea
25
 describes in detail the 
measures adopted by the government to overhaul the way chaebols were 
managed after the financial crisis. This was done in several ways, namely 
improving their corporate governance, welcoming foreign investors to 
participate in the local economy, promoting labour flexibility and tightening 
the financial industry. Chaebols were renowned for their multi diversification 
practices, high levels of debt and because of a centralised and familial style of 
management, poor levels of internal discipline and oversight. On the basis that 
they were inefficient entities whose hold on the economy needed to be broken, 
they were forced to downsize, limit the number of potential affiliates and cut 
down on amount of debt they could guarantee. Heavy fines were imposed on 
what was perceived to be ‗unfair‘ internal transactions. Laws and regulations 
based on the Anglo American corporate governance model were introduced to 
increase corporate transparency and accountability and to align directors‘ and 
shareholders‘ interests. The law imposed Anglo American style ‗fiduciary 
duties‘ on directors, required companies to recruit independent outside 
directors, increased the levels of financial reporting and allowed minority 
shareholders to commence actions against the board. A corporate governance 
code of best practice was also introduced.
26
 Finally, controlling shareholders 
were forced to accept various disclosure obligations to reveal their interests.  
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 This is particularly well discussed in HJ Kim, ―Living with the IMF: A new 
approach to corporate governance and regulation of financial institutions in 
Korea‖ (1999), Berkeley Journal of International Law, 17, 1, 61– 94, although 
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 See for example Crotty & Lee, (2001), Shin & Chang, (2005), Kim, (2006) 
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26
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In addition to overhauling the way chaebols were managed, the literature also 
shows how the government welcomed foreign investment, on the basis that it 
would constitute the key to successful corporate and financial restructuring.
27
 
Indeed, the government viewed their participation as potentially increasing 
competition, enabling new managerial methods to be imported and destroying 
the ability of chaebols to block economic reform. With the blame for the crisis 
laid on chaebols, continued reliance on a chaebol-centred system to ensure 
economic growth was seriously questioned. To encourage foreign investment, 
restrictions on foreign ownership of shares and national assets were removed. 
The percentage of foreign ownership in the Korean economy quickly 
increased.
28
 However, this brought with it two significant consequences – first, 
the acceleration of Anglo American corporate governance, and second, an 
increase in mergers and acquisitions.
29
 Finally, the government streamlined the 
provision of credit to chaebols by restructuring the banking system. Through 
mergers and acquisitions, the number of banks declined dramatically.
30
 Rules 
were introduced to require banks to maintain a Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) capital adequacy ratio
31
 of 8% as a condition of lending, a 
standard many banks found impossible to meet.
32
 Their credit evaluation 
systems, prudential regulation and criteria for loan classification and risk 
management criteria were all brought into line with international standards.
33
 
This had the dramatic effect of emasculating banks, once core players in the 
governance of Korean companies.  
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Many scholars have blamed the measures taken by the government post 1997 
as responsible for the significant costs experienced by the country‘s financial 
and corporate sectors, as well as society generally.
34
 I show that due to 
variances in culture, reform measures adopted from foreign jurisdictions have 
proven unsuitable in addressing the problems of a flailing corporate 
governance regime. The dynastic control by families of Korean chaebols 
presented unusual corporate governance problems which required specially 
tailored solutions; the answer did not lie simply in transplanting laws from 
other jurisdictions in the hope of reproducing their successes. Thus, simple 
mimetic adoption of these laws has proved inadequate. 
 
FAILED REFORM MEASURES 
I explain in two of my works (L Miles, ―The Application of Anglo American 
corporate practices in societies influenced by Confucian values‖ (2006), 
Business and Society Review, 111, 3, 305 – 322 and L Miles "Transferring the 
Anglo American System to South Korea: At What Cost and Are there 
Alternatives?" (2008), Bond Law Review, 20, 2, 71 – 91) how the new 
corporate governance regime presented challenges which were not readily 
understandable to a Korean society influenced by Confucian values. I 
illustrated this by using some examples. Thus, the recruitment of independent 
directors in Korean companies was problematical, given the nature of their 
tasks. The need for independent directors to behave without prejudice and in a 
normatively ‗objective‘ manner was viewed as unacceptable in a culture where 
conformity was expected. Similarly, chaebols experienced difficulty in 
meeting disclosure obligations under the new regime. Traditionally, there was 
little need to make disclosures to shareholders in Korean companies for the 
simple reason that there were few outside shareholders. Companies were 
owned and managed by controlling shareholders, who were also their founders. 
Thirdly, the company, traditionally viewed as a support network for workers, 
disintegrated, in the face of increasing legislation being enacted to legalise lay 
offs, redundancies and increase reliance on casual and irregular workers. The 
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 See for example, Lim & Jang, (2006), Crotty & Lee, (2001), Kim, (2006), 
Cho & Keum, (2004), Chang & Shin, (2002). 
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loss of a sense of community and trust in society, increasing inequality 
between core and casual workers, job insecurity and the low morale which 
resulted were said to be liable to raise transaction costs and adversely affect the 
Korean economy in the future.
35
 Fourthly, the financial crisis brought about 
significant changes in the role of banks, traditionally key players in the 
economy. In the previous institutional framework, the state, banks and business 
groups shared the risks involved in managing the economy. As a result of 
restructuring and mergers in the financial industry, however, the risk taking 
role was removed from the state and chaebols (in the latter, by banning internal 
transactions, mutual guarantees and cross shareholding) and given over to 
financial institutions, despite the fact that their own risk-taking capability was 
also severely constrained. The primary concern of these institutions was now 
to meet newly introduced supervision standards, which in general penalised 
corporate lending. They thus had little incentive to take high risks in lending or 
resolve problems of bad loans by turning troubled companies around, tending 
instead, to sell poorly performing firms at a discounted price or liquidating 
them. All in all, reform measures have brought little but malfunction to the 
Korean financial industry.
36
 Finally, Koreans traditionally lived their lives in 
pursuit of harmony. Confucian societies were not litigious. Disputes were 
solved through mediation and negotiation, not through the court system. 
Moreover, as directors were often related to controlling shareholders, few 
instances arose where legal action was taken against the former for misconduct 
or breach of duties. Individuals and businesses also dealt with each other only 
after getting to know each other and establishing trust. Unlike business 
relationships in the west, businesses in Korea did not typically rely on contract 
or legal rules to conclude business deals. It was thus unsurprising that there has 
traditionally been little need for black letter law, attorneys or a sophisticated 
judicial system. Indeed, despite moves to encourage shareholder intervention 
in the company by strengthening their legal rights, shareholder involvement 
has continued to be modest. They have experienced difficulties in tackling 
poor governance practices not only because the board continued to enjoy the  
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support of controlling shareholders, but because they could not obtain the 
information they needed, or count on support from other shareholders. Even 
when they have commenced legal action against they board, they have only 
obtained relatively modest remedies. Korean judges are traditionally 
generalists, with no expertise in dealing with company or securities cases.
37
 In 
summary, the adoption of corporate governance measures based on foreign 
models has not proved cost effective and has not brought about the anticipated 
results. 
 
THE FUTURE 
I also highlight (in L Miles ―Transferring the Anglo American System to South 
Korea: At What Cost and Are there Alternatives?‖ (2008), Bond Law Review, 
20, 2, 71 – 91), the work of Korean scholars who argue that the Korean 
government should have modernised the traditional model (building on its 
strengths and minimising its weaknesses), not break with it.
38
 The perspectives 
of the Korean people themselves with regard to the reform measures adopted 
after the 1997 financial crisis have received little attention in conventional 
corporate governance literature in the west. This is a gap which I fill. Many 
Korean scholars argue that the reform process was not carried out in a manner 
which met the needs of the Korean people. For example, given the historical 
importance of banks in corporate governance, it might have been more 
effective to introduce mechanisms to increase their efficiency as management 
monitors, rather than taking away their ability to do so by radically 
restructuring them. Secondly, despite their weaknesses, one of the strengths of 
chaebols was their ability to take business risks, due to financial and resource  
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 Indeed, even with radical changes to the corporate governance system, it is 
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support networks between companies. But the prohibition on internal 
transactions in chaebols drastically reduced their ability to support new 
ventures. Rather than ban internal transactions altogether, would it not have 
been more pragmatic to increase company transparency or to strengthen the 
right of minority shareholders to monitor these transactions?
39
 Thirdly, the 
desire for foreign capital must be set against potential costs. Foreign investors 
typically prioritise the maximisation of short term profit. It has been argued 
that this is at variance with the Korean ethic of prioritising long term growth.
40
 
Finally, despite various claims that capital markets can carry out a disciplining 
function, their effectiveness in doing so has not yet been demonstrated in 
Korea, not least because a large proportion of the affiliates of chaebols remain 
unlisted. Due to the practice of cross shareholding, it is still possible for owner 
directors to accumulate control and voting power despite an apparently low 
level of ownership. This, coupled with poor levels of disclosure, has continued 
to protect their position and has restricted the ability of the capital markets to 
exercise a disciplining function.
41
  
Overall, it is misguided to regard the implementation of the new regime as a 
cure for corporate governance failure in Korean companies. Perhaps 
recognising the benefits traditional corporate structures can bring, the 
government recently eased restrictions on chaebols so they may invest more in 
their affiliates. New regulations were introduced to relax the cross 
shareholding limit and allow chaebols to hold up to 40% in affiliates. Despite 
criticisms that these measures would pave the way for chaebols to dominate 
the economy once again, the government insisted that the revision would 
encourage corporate investment in the current climate of economic 
                                                 
39
 Chang & Shin (2002), pp. 270 
40
 Shin & Chang, (2005), pp. 429 
41
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uncertainty.
42
 It is also anticipated that the government will remove restrictions 
on chaebols owning banks, counteracting recent attempts to reform the 
financial sector.
43
 Thus, despite the Anglo American corporate governance 
model being touted as the solution for corporate and economic revival, it has 
not proved to be an antidote to Korean corporate governance failure, because 
many of the practices promoted under the model have proved unsuitable in a 
fundamentally different culture. 
 
(2) CHINA: A FORMALLY COMMUNIST POLITICAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
I investigate the wealth of literature which discusses the development of 
corporate governance in China
44
 in my works (L Miles & Z Zhang, 
―Improving corporate governance in state owned enterprises in China: Which 
way forward?‖ (2006), Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 6, 1, 213 – 248 and 
L Miles & M He, ―Protecting the rights and interests of minority shareholders 
in China: Challenges for the future‖ (2005) International Company and 
Commercial law Review, 16, 7, 275 – 290). Since 1978, various reform 
measures have been implemented to enable the Chinese economy to progress 
from a centrally directed economy to one in which elements of ‗free markets‘ 
can play a role. A central theme of the reform programme has been to improve 
the performance of state owned enterprises (SOEs), which, prior to the 
adoption of market based reforms, were both unprofitable and inefficient. The 
government undertook to make SOEs more productive by converting them into 
companies with separate legal identities (arrangements based on Anglo 
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Hyderabad, India), 2007, Chapter 8 and G Wei, ―Ownership Structure, 
Corporate Governance and Company Performance in China‖ (2007), Asia 
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American corporate practice). It believed that corporatisation would improve 
SOE productivity and performance, allow them to generate income from other 
avenues and increase overall wealth. Many SOEs were converted into public 
companies and listed on China‘s stock exchanges. In theory at least, they 
would become independent (of the state), be able to make their own decisions 
and be responsive to market forces. The number of listed companies expanded 
rapidly, as did the number of registered investors. Today, over 1600 companies 
are listed on China‘s stock exchanges,45 virtually all having been converted 
from SOEs. Within a short space of time, the corporate landscape in China 
changed remarkably.  
 
 Whether or not measures based on the Anglo American model have improved 
SOE governance and productivity is the subject of contention among scholars 
of Chinese corporate governance. I show that the adoption of measures based 
on the Anglo American model has not worked to improve governance because 
corporate governance reform is incompatible with the country‘s political 
environment. Many of the problems experienced relate to state ownership of 
shares. Under the communist system, the state owns all property on behalf of 
the people – the Chinese economy continues to be characterised by this feature. 
Despite ongoing plans to reform the economy along the lines of ‗free market‘ 
principles, and although other forms of ownership including private ownership 
have gradually been allowed, the state continues to control the reform process 
through its ownership of companies.
46
 Thus, despite converting SOEs into 
listed companies, the state continues to control them. Empirical research shows 
that the direct and indirect control of companies by the state is very substantial; 
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the state owns up to two thirds of the total issued shares in China.
47
 Various 
reasons exist for state control, but the desire to maintain employment levels, 
control sensitive industries and ensure social stability feature highly.
48
 That the 
state as majority shareholder has several negative connotations for corporate 
governance, is widely asserted in ‗free market‘ literature.49  
 
I show how corporate governance problems have arisen because the state, as 
majority shareholder, has not exercised its right to monitor management. As 
the state has no physical presence in its companies, it has to act through agents. 
However, these are typically civil servants recruited from government 
departments, not capitalists interested in the economic performance of 
companies. Crucial company-related functions are thus liable to be performed 
without adequate care. For example, as civil servants do not benefit from 
appointing competent directors nor bear negative consequences if they 
appointed unsuitable ones, there is little incentive for them to employ the best 
individuals for the job. In many cases, directors themselves have associates in 
                                                 
47
 Shi, (2007), at 862. See also R Tomasic & N Andrews, ―Minority 
Shareholder Protection in China‘s Top 100 Listed Companies‖ (2007), The 
Australian Journal of Asian Law, 9, 1, 88-119 who show the considerable 
influence the state as majority shareholder over the governance of companies, 
despite the presence of laws protecting minority shareholders. Further, see G 
Liu & P Sun, ―Ownership and Control of Chinese Public Corporations: A State 
Dominated Corporate Governance System‖ in K Keasey et.al. (eds.) Corporate 
Governance: Accountability, Enterprise and International Comparisons, 2005, 
(Chichester: John Wiley & Sons), Chapter 16. 
48
 D Clarke, ―Corporate Governance in China: An Overview‖ (2003), China 
Economic Review, 14, 4, 494 – 507, pp. 495.  
49
 See for example, A Shleifer & RW Vishny. ―Politicians and Firms‖ (1994), 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 737 – 783, M Boycko, A Shleifer & RW 
Vishny, ―A Theory of Privatisation‖ (1996), Economic Journal, 106, 309 – 
319, A Krueger, ―Government Failures in Development‖ (1990), Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 4, 3, 9-23, E Chang & S Wong, ―Political Control and 
Performance in China‘s listed firms‖ (2004) Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 32, 4, 617 – 636, C Xu, T Zhu & YM Lin, ―Politician control, 
agency problems and ownership reform: Evidence from China‖ (2005), 
Economics of Transition, 13, 1, 1 – 24, JQ Qiu, ―Corporate Governance in 
China: From the Protection of Minority Shareholders Perspective‖ (2005), at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=905170> , L Chen & DW 
Su, ―Does State Control Affect Managerial Incentives? Evidence from China‘s 
Public Listed Firms‖ (2009), Journal of Business Economics & Management, 4, 
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the Communist Party as well as in governmental departments, and derive 
support from them. Despite the law imposing various duties and 
responsibilities on directors, they have little fear of being dismissed for 
mismanagement. Embezzlement of corporate property is rife, with directors 
openly benefiting themselves and their cronies. Secondly, state appointed 
directors prioritised the achievement of state-set targets rather than maximising 
profit for the enterprise.
50
 This gives rise to problems for corporate 
governance. Where civil servants are the same persons as company directors, 
they are bound by the constraints set by government policies. The objectives of 
the government (maintaining social stability, ensuring full employment and 
preserving control over sensitive industries) often come into conflict with the 
interests of the company as a business enterprise. Thirdly, as authority to direct 
the company is shared among many different regulatory bodies, institutions 
and ministries, no one is directly accountable for its failures.
51
 In response to 
these problems, the government set up an asset management agency (SASAC – 
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission) in 2003 to 
consolidate the functions previously shared by these agencies, such as carrying 
out ownership functions on behalf of the state, reorganising SOEs, appointing 
directors and carrying out audit functions. The intention was for the large 
numbers of SOEs to be restructured to reduce their number, so as to increase 
competitiveness and efficiency. To date, however, SASAC has only achieved 
limited success, in large part because acting both as owner and regulator 
creates conflicts of interest.
52
  
Research emanating from those within the ‗free market‘ tradition argues that 
state ownership weakens corporate governance.
53
 To improve corporate 
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governance in Chinese companies, many have called for state ownership of 
shares to be transferred to private investors. Thus, the state‘s dual role of 
controlling shareholder and holder of political power should be separated. In 
terms of financial performance, the literature suggests that companies with 
dominant state ownership performed worse compared to those without 
dominant state ownership. The literature also indicates that changes to 
company value and financial performance were much greater when ownership 
was transferred from SOEs to private entities than when ownership was simply 
transferred from one SOE to another. Improved performance after ownership 
was transferred to private investors indicates, it is suggested, that private 
investors were better equipped and had greater incentive than SOEs to monitor 
and discipline directors.
54
 In responding to these arguments, the government 
relaxed the prohibition on the trading of state shares in 2005. At the end of 
2004, non-tradable shares accounted for 65% of total shares in the Chinese 
capital market.
55
 Virtually all listed companies in China have today been able 
to dispose of state owned shares on the markets,
56
 although it is anticipated that 
restrictions on the extent to which such shares can be traded freely will remain 
for several more years. It is envisaged that governance problems caused by the 
non-tradability of shares will diminish quickly. It may well also be the case 
that state shares will be sold to private investors on the open market, which 
will lead to a more efficient market for corporate control. 
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Although the Chinese state may, for political reasons, maintain control of its 
companies, I argue in my works that there are other (albeit limited) ways in 
which corporate governance can be improved even within this framework. 
These include strengthening the rights of minority shareholders (the law 
already enables cumulative voting and the commencement of derivative 
actions, but it is ambiguous), encouraging institutional shareholder activism 
(institutional shareholders are still low in numbers because of the non-
tradability of state owned shares) and strengthening the monitoring capacity of 
independent directors through education and training. Within the existing 
company law framework, laws can also be strictly enforced in order to deter 
directors from engaging in corrupt activities or embezzlement. Public 
regulators and the judiciary need to understand the rationale of the reforms and 
fulfil their law enforcement duties accordingly. Professional directorial 
associations can also be set up in order to set standards, guide and educate 
directors so they can discharge their responsibilities efficiently. I point out in 
my works that to date, inadequate attention has been given to these measures to 
improve corporate governance.
57
 
 
In summary, I suggest that Chinese corporate governance derives its features 
from China‘s political orientation. The state continues to hold a controlling 
stake in its companies, formally on behalf of the people. Attempting to reform 
corporate governance in this context by adopting the Anglo American model 
raises inherent tensions and difficulties. Indeed, it said that ―it is particularly 
difficult for the Chinese legal system to borrow from Western jurisdictions 
because the Chinese system, as a result of its history… is concerned more with 
the balancing of interests than with the vindication of rights.‖58 The Chinese 
system revolves around the supremacy of the state. So long as it refuses to 
relinquish its shareholding in its companies, the adoption of measures from the 
Anglo American corporate model (recruitment of business-oriented individuals 
to manage the company, the establishment of active markets for corporate 
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control, strengthening the rights of minority shareholders, encouraging 
shareholder activism, the pursuit of profit etc.) are unlikely to work to improve 
governance standards. All in all, it may be that the obsession with adopting the 
Anglo American governance model has not led to sufficient regard being given 
to whether its specific variant of communist ideology is compatible with this 
model.  
 
(3) WHERE RELIGION DOMINATES: MALAYSIA 
 Countries with an Islamic tradition (for example, United Arab Emirates, 
Malaysia, Brunei, Pakistan, Indonesia and Turkey) are, like all others, subject 
to pressures to attract investment or be competitive in global markets. Within 
these countries, Islam wields a significant influence over all aspects of life. 
Many of these countries have adopted governance templates based on the 
Anglo American model. But how appropriate are these measures in improving 
corporate governance within their companies? I explore the compatibility 
between Islamic and Anglo American values in Malaysia. Malaysia presents an 
interesting case study, because it is both an Islamic country and one regarded 
as modern and forward looking. It is also home to many multinationals and 
foreign investors. Thus it constitutes fertile ground in which to study the 
application of the Islamic faith to a business environment influenced by 
western values. 
 
 ISLAMIC TEACHINGS 
I describe in my work (L Miles & S Goulding, “Corporate Governance in 
Western (Anglo American) and Islamic Communities: Prospects for 
Convergence?‖ (2010), Journal of Business Law, 2, 126 – 149) the principles 
upon which Muslims are required to conduct business. I also explain that the 
extent to which a business framework based on religion is compatible with that 
of the Anglo American model is attracting growing academic interest. 
Primarily, this is because of increasing trade between Islamic countries and the 
West, but also because many scholars are arguing that western business 
principles lack a moral dimension and are advocating a new kind of business 
conduct (based on Islam) by demonstrating positive associations between 
religious faith and business transactions. The continuing uneasy relations 
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between the Middle East and the West have led many Islamic thinkers to 
debate the likelihood of finding common ground between Islamic and Western 
values. Indeed, the question of whether or not the Muslim community engages 
with a world dominated by Western secular values has been propelled to centre 
stage recently by the rise of Islamic movements determined to resist Western 
domination and control over Muslim territories. In the light of these 
developments, it is timely to investigate the compatibility between Islamic 
values and Anglo American corporate governance. 
 
Islam requires all Islamic organisations to serve God and develop a culture 
which advances Islamic objectives. Islam does not discourage or prohibit trade, 
business or the creation of wealth; on the contrary, business is regarded as 
socially useful and morally justified.
59
 However, it introduces a moral filter to 
which wealth creation is subject. In other words, individual freedom to pursue 
economic activity does not operate without a sense of responsibility and 
Muslims are required to observe certain restraints when carrying out business. 
Although pursuing material wealth is not wrong, wealth has a corrupting effect, 
and if pursued without restraint, will distract Muslims from achieving spiritual 
and material well being.
60
 Thus businesses are required to fulfil a moral duty 
toward their stakeholders, such as their workers, and to the environment.
61
 
Muslims are also required to give alms to help the poor and needy in society.
62
 
Perhaps most significantly, the Islamic business system emphasises ‗value‘ 
maximisation for the greater good, rather than ‗profit‘ maximisation for the 
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satisfaction of a few.
63
 Businesses which prioritised profit are regarded as 
wasteful, liable to encourage divisiveness between those who can afford 
products and services and those who cannot and liable to cause damage to the 
environment through pollution.
64
 The Islamic position is that if businesses 
turned away from prioritising material wealth, and if justice became an integral 
part of business, then a harmonious global atmosphere would result, but which 
would not detract from promoting competitiveness.
65
 Adherence to the Islamic 
ethical framework ensures dignity and freedom from all types of bondage.
66
 It 
also allows individuals to earn their living in a fair and equitable manner 
without exploiting others, so that ultimately, society benefits.  In other words, 
it has in western terms, more of an emphasis on what economists call ‗welfare‘ 
and ‗public goods‘ production. 
 
ISLAMIC PRINCIPLES AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN 
MODEL: INHERENT TENSIONS 
There are various tensions between Islamic business principles and those 
inherent in the Anglo American corporate governance model. I deal with this 
point in detail in my work mentioned above. The Anglo American corporate 
governance model concerns itself with promoting and prioritising the rights 
and interests of shareholders. Islam however, requires the consideration of a 
wider range of stakeholders.
67
 Secondly, the dominant theoretical model of 
Anglo American corporate governance is based on agency theory, rather than 
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stewardship theory. Directors are regarded not as stewards who are naturally 
motivated to act in the best interests of the principal, but as self-interested, 
opportunistic agents who have to be watched over and controlled (see the 
agency theory discussion above). This view necessitates the creation of laws 
and other mechanisms to ensure that directors do not abuse their powers. 
Under strict Islamic principles, however, directors are not viewed in this 
manner – Muslims are taught to be faithful stewards of assets entrusted to them; 
indeed, the demonstration of this faithfulness is regarded as an act of worship. 
Islam thus starts from a different perspective, it does not envisage that 
directors‘ powers be curbed; on the contrary, it presupposes that Muslims 
desire to live by the word of God. Thirdly, it is said that a capitalist economy 
emphasises the individual and his pursuit of pleasure. Man is free to satisfy his 
needs in any manner possible, as long as in doing so, he does not infringe the 
rights of others or contravene the law. The Islamic religion, on the other hand, 
believes that God is the only source capable of satisfying the needs and desires 
of man. It does not deny our needs, but sets guidelines as to how these needs 
and desires can be fulfilled. Islam condemns waste, exploitation and 
indulgence and prohibits Muslims from engaging in specific activities, which 
are considered haram (forbidden).
68
  
 
 Many Middle Eastern scholars regard Islam and western capitalist principles 
(inherent in the Anglo American corporate governance model) as diametrically 
opposed.
69
 Capitalism is rejected on the basis that it lacks balance and 
moderation, excessively emphasises individual rights, materialism and freedom 
of enterprise which cause suffering and injustice for those who are poor. The 
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west also represents, to many Muslims, a world which is characterised by 
disintegrating societies in which selfishness and loneliness prevail. Materialism 
and the quest for wealth dominate the thinking of people who are imprisoned 
by their desire for money. Their value systems are seen as being based on 
secular economics, where people aggressively exploit each other and where 
society is divided into classes which resent one another, as evidenced by the 
levels of crime, poverty and frustration among the young and unemployed. 
Finally, such scholars view the west as aggressive, due to their policies of 
colonialism, economic exploitation and political domination of the world. As a 
result, they reject western influences on the basis that they corrupt  Islamic 
societies.
70
 
  
 MY RESEARCH 
In order to investigate whether Islamic business principles are compatible with 
those under the Anglo American (‗free market‘) model, I conducted several 
interviews with Muslim directors in various companies in Malaysia. This study 
was carried out in 2008 (discussed in my work above) and was funded by the 
British Academy. Despite the large volume of literature on Islamic business 
principles, little empirical research has been conducted to examine the extent 
to which they are in practice, compatible with the Anglo American corporate 
governance model. I attempt to fill this gap.  
As a former British colony, Malaysia inherited the English common law 
system. Company law in Malaysia is based on the Anglo American model, and 
follows its developments closely. I briefly discussed the corporate governance 
regime in Malaysia in my other work on Malaysia (L Miles, ―Waking Up after 
the 1997 Financial Crisis: Corporate Governance in Malaysia‖ (2004), Journal 
of International Banking law and Regulation, 20, 1, 21 – 32). It shows the 
existence of a sophisticated company law regime and describes the active roles 
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played by the legal and accountancy professions, the media, institutional 
shareholders and company regulators in corporate governance.
71
  
 
In investigating the compatibility between Islamic business principles and the 
Anglo American corporate governance model, I pay particular attention to the 
contribution of Mahathir bin Mohammed (Prime Minister from 1981 to 2003) 
in blending Islam and modernity. The period under his leadership saw 
Malaysia change from an agricultural-based economy to an industrialised 
nation, with its population acquiring extensive knowledge in science and 
medicine, technology and engineering. Mahathir welcomed foreign 
investment, reformed the tax structure, reduced trade tariffs and privatised 
several state-owned enterprises. I show that although he was committed to the 
‗Islamisation‘ of Malaysia, Mahathir was also critical of Muslims preoccupied 
with ritualistic Islam and who possessed an introverted or conservative 
interpretation of religion.
72
 He urged Muslims to engage with worldly affairs, 
to achieve distinction in secular education and to look beyond religion. He 
propagated a ‗progressive‘ version of Islam (Islam Hadhari), believing that 
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Islamisation and modernisation can go hand in hand.
73
 His message that Islam 
can be modern, liberal and progressive was aimed not only to challenge the 
mindset of the Muslim community, but also to encourage the collaboration 
between the Muslim and non-Muslim population.
74
 
Far from rejecting the Anglo American model on the basis that its values were 
incompatible with that of Islam, all the participants in my study welcomed the 
model and the ‗free market‘ system as frameworks in which business can 
flourish. All recognised the importance of profit and wealth creation for 
society and the economy and none perceived a conflict between Islam and 
capitalist principles. They did however, emphasise the importance of moral 
values, a sense of accountability and a caring spirit taught by Islam, which they 
perceived as an antidote to the negative repercussions of the ‗free market‘ 
system. They also stressed the need for Islam to be forward thinking and to be 
able to change with the times in order to accommodate the needs of modern 
society, clearly embracing the approach advocated by Mahathir. 
A caveat is however, required. The research I conducted in Malaysia was  
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highly selective and I targeted only high profile, and internationally known, 
companies. It thus only presented a snap shot of ideas and views of company 
directors in Malaysia. They may not necessarily represent the experience of the 
wider community of directors. There may also have been ‗social desirability‘ 
effects in the responses of those interviewed. For a more rounded picture to be 
presented, research should target smaller, local and less well known companies 
in order to elicit the views of their Muslim management. The latter may 
present a different view of the compatibility of western and Islamic business 
models.  
 
More generally, I point out in my work that the relationship between Islam and 
the west continues to be a troubled one. One cannot ignore the rise of Islamic 
movements (e.g. Al Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Armed Islamic 
Group, Hizbul Mujahideen) determined to resist western domination and 
control over Muslim territories. Their demands to uphold Sha‘ria law and to 
destroy those regarded as ‗enemies of Islam‘ has provoked aggression against 
Islam and its followers. ‗Wahhabism‘, a version of Islam which insists on a 
literal interpretation of the Qu‘ran, constitutes an influential force in their lives. 
Wahhabis regard their version of Islam as the only path of true Islam and 
oppose any interpretation which aligns Islam with western standards, notably 
with regards to gender equality and democracy. They also regard individuals 
who did not practice their version of Islam as heathens and enemies. Many in 
the west (who are not necessarily aware of the different versions of Islam) 
openly accuse Islam and the Islamic community of being a threat to security 
and democracy, although Islamic movements justify their actions on the basis 
that they are simply resisting western arrogance. Islamic movements have 
opposed the occupation of Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan and the adverse 
publicity Islam receives in the west. The ongoing antagonistic relationship 
between the west and these Islamists has continued over the decades to stall 
attempts to initiate dialogue to build peaceful relations across cultural and  
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religious diversity.
75
  
 
PART B  
THE IMPACT OF TRANSPLANTATING ANGLO 
AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES ON THE  
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
  
Finally, I demonstrate in my works (L Miles ―The Significance of Cultural 
Norms in the Evolution of Korean HRM Practices‖ International Journal of 
Law and Management, 2008, 50, 1, 33 – 46 and L Miles, ―Current Changes in 
Labour Management and Industrial Relations in Japan and Their Impact on its 
‗Stakeholder Oriented‘ Governance Model‖, Managerial Law, 2007, 49, 4,  
117-128) how the employment relationship
76
 in Asian companies is being  
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undermined by practices which, being based on the Anglo American 
governance model, promote the adoption of flexible working practices,
77
 
encourage increasing reliance on legal rights to protect individual and 
collective interests and increase levels of mistrust between employers and 
worker. The effects of policies derived from the Anglo American model on 
employment practices, and more fundamentally, on the cultural and traditional 
values of Asian societies is a topic worthy of consideration because they 
inform us as to whether adopting employment practices from foreign 
jurisdictions to improve company efficiency is, for Asian countries, necessarily 
the most efficient and equitable way forward. I investigate the practicability 
and consequences of implementing Anglo American employment practices in 
Japanese and Korean companies, two societies heavily influenced by 
Confucian values. 
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CONFUCIAN CULTURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  
In the years of economic success of Asian countries (many of which shared 
Confucian traits), in particular during the 1980s, the possibility that culture 
constituted an explanation for their prosperity attracted much academic 
interest.
78
 Strong leadership, collectivism, an emphasis on consensus and 
cooperation, national consciousness and a thirst for education all enabled 
economic growth to occur. ‗Collectivism‘ in this context stressed the 
importance of cooperation and unity and encouraged loyalty and conformity to 
authority. A community spirit helped promote the interest of the whole 
company. The importance placed on education and self improvement led to the 
development of scientific and technological expertise, a high quality labour 
force and high productivity. Lastly, an emphasis on group harmony enabled 
workers to reach agreement on the importance of achieving future growth. 
Thus, countries such as Japan and Korea were able to develop rapidly since the  
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1960s, because of the favourable effects of their Confucian culture.
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JAPANESE AND KOREAN LABOUR MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICES 
In my works, I underline the importance of Confucian values in the 
employment relationship in Japanese and Korean companies. Companies in 
both countries were traditionally constructed as families. In Whitley‘s terms, 
there were high levels of employer-worker interdependence. Workers 
integrated themselves into their companies through working hard and 
demonstrating loyalty to their employers. In return, employers rewarded them 
by looking after their welfare, and by investing heavily in educating and 
training them. Workers usually stayed with their companies until retirement 
age. Directors were appointed from the pool of senior, long-serving workers 
within the company. As a result, management and workers have shared views 
and interests.
80
 Japanese and Korean companies traditionally also operated a 
wage and promotion system based on seniority. Last but not least, companies 
were very much regarded as providers of social security. In times of distress, 
they would attempt to keep workers within the business rather than make them 
redundant, by cutting back on dividends, reducing overtime opportunities and 
offering voluntary retirement. Trust, long-term commitment and co-operation 
were central elements in the relationship between the company and its workers. 
Certainly, the success of the Japanese economy in the 30 years before the 
financial crisis was attributed by many to the strong relations between  
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companies and their workers.
81
 
 
JAPANESE AND KOREAN COMPANIES ABANDON 
TRADITIONAL LABOUR MANAGEMENT  
After the Asian financial crisis, many traditional company practices had to be 
abandoned, because they could not cope with the pressures and demands set by 
liberalisation and globalisation. In my works mentioned above, I show how 
traditional employment practices have changed to illustrate how they have been 
undermined by practices from foreign jurisdictions. Fierce global competition 
demanded a more efficient utilisation of resources, and calls to formulate a new 
labour management system based on Anglo American principles, which would 
provide flexibility and enable companies to compete, were quickly heeded. I 
then posit, in view of the significant costs which followed, whether there were 
alternative paths Japanese and Korean companies could have taken. I discuss 
how these companies, which previously employed almost identical 
employment practices, have had to discard these.
 
Traditional practices such as 
life long employment and promotion based on seniority were replaced by 
reliance on casual labour and performance based pay and promotion systems. 
Companies removed excess personnel by flattening their organisational 
hierarchy. Many companies introduced a mandatory retirement age, forcing 
senior workers to retire. Laws were amended to legalise lay offs and remove 
employment protection. The use of outsourcing increased. Courts were forced 
to recognise that economic efficiency necessitated the institution of policies 
which made it easier for companies to dismiss their workers, and so interpreted  
 
statutes allowing dismissals in favour of employers.
82
 Further, in order to 
optimise the use of resources, many companies started to experiment with 
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Anglo American style performance appraisal systems to evaluate the 
productivity of workers as the basis for promotion. Lastly, companies began to 
recruit specialists to meet specific company strategies, rather than employ 
generalists who could perform different kinds of roles and who could provide 
internal flexibility.
83
 In short, they started to use ‗calculative‘ human resource  
 
management practices as Gooderham describes them.
84
 All in all, confidence in 
traditional values was shaken.  
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The power of trade unions in both Japan and Korea also weakened 
dramatically. In Japan, the proportion of workers joining unions dropped from 
55.8% in 1949 to less than 20% in 2005.
 85
 In Korea, the evidence currently 
shows a unionisation rate of just 10.8%.
86
 With the gradual decline in trade 
union influence, workers began to turn to the law to protect their interests. In 
Japan, the number of individual labour disputes has increased sharply in the 
last ten years.
87
 With the gradual erosion of the relationships between 
companies and workers,  laws
88
 were introduced to set minimum work 
standards, prohibit discriminative practices and provide quick and effective 
dispute resolution mechanisms in the event of dispute.
89
 In Korea, laws 
governing the resolution of individual labour disputes and the guarantee of 
certain rights in the work place
90
 have also increasingly been utilised by 
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workers in order to protect their interests, as shown by the escalating numbers 
of individual labour disputes in recent years.
91
 
THE FUTURE OF JAPANESE AND KOREAN 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS  
I investigate whether recent shifts in employment practices indicate a marginal 
or central development in Japanese and Korean employment relations. In Japan, 
some scholars argue that it is inaccurate to say that there is a definite evolution 
toward the Anglo American model and that whilst Japanese companies are 
adopting its employment practices, they have been able to adapt and modify 
their traditional model of governance.
92
 Others say that changes are only 
―occurring within the framework of the stakeholder model…not likely…[that it 
will] completely convert into the shareholder value model, at least for the time 
being‖.93 Still others propose that employers could opt for a middle way, in 
order that traditional elements of Japanese labour practices may be retained– 
that is, through worker share schemes. It is argued that allowing workers to 
share in the capital of the company would enable the continuation of stable 
cooperation between management and workers, the very foundation of 
traditional Japanese management.
94
 Thus whilst employment practices in Japan 
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are changing, it is difficult to identify precisely to what extent, as there is 
evidence that its core practices are continuing.
95
  
 
 The same arguments are made with regard to Korean employment practices. 
Confucian traits such as patriarchy, collectivism, an emphasis on solidarity and 
cooperation are no longer regarded as compatible with the modern ‗free 
market‘ system. The importation of new practices has been criticised as 
causing damage to society.
96
 Should companies continue to shed traditional 
practices because they are seemingly at odds with globalisation? Defenders of 
the Confucian tradition have resisted the spread of western influences and 
values into Korea, arguing that Confucian values are needed to counteract 
individualism and materialism which have seeped into Korean companies. The 
emphasis on individualism and materialism in the west are seen as having 
caused the Korean economy to disintegrate and become devoid of morals, 
where families and communities are breaking down and where the gap between 
the rich and poor is widening. Poorer classes are alienated, material wealth is 
exalted and success is achieved by exploiting labour and the environment. 
Confucian values, with their emphasis on solidarity, harmony and support on  
 the other hand, can act as a rehabilitative remedy for modern society.
97
 
 
I suggest that following a foreign model may be self-defeating as it destroys 
national elements which are crucial for future growth. Scholars point to 
research which shows that companies which keep traditional employment 
practices have been able to maximise the advantages of Confucian values. For 
example, some have retained the seniority principle, by applying performance 
related remuneration and promotion only to managers or workers with higher 
qualifications. Others have awarded remuneration not on the basis of 
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individual achievement, but on the basis of group merit. Still others have 
achieved flexibility by utilising job rotation, offering reduced over time hours, 
encouraging workers to take temporary leave and making use of temporary 
retirement schemes instead of dismissing workers outright. The employment of 
such practices combines the benefits of Confucian culture with those of 
western practices to produce a system which contains characteristics that 
reflect traits from both.
98
 Thus, it may be over simplistic
99
 to assume that 
Korean systems are abandoning traditional employment practices in favour of 
western ones, rather, it may be that, in the long term, a hybrid model will 
emerge.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The works presented in this document contribute to an understanding of the 
problems and practicalities involved in implementing the Anglo American 
corporate governance model in Asian countries. They have drawn on three 
perspectives (‗culturalist‘; ‗institutionalist‘; ‗historical-political‘) to explain 
why problems have arisen when foreign corporate governance models are 
adopted to improve company performance in Asian countries. Initially, I drew 
only upon the ‗culturalist‘ perspective. I soon recognised however, that there 
were other perspectives which could be used to explain the same subject. I 
have thus reflected on how ‗institutional‘ and ‗political‘ theories can be used in 
this regard. With regard to the first, I realised the need for corporate 
governance models to be legitimised by existing institutions in the host country 
before they can facilitate change in corporate behaviour. This does not take 
place quickly. With regard to the second, I began to understand how 
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of a labyrinth after the Asian crisis as changes in its HRM have been 
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governance models imported from jurisdictions with different political 
orientations are unlikely to bring about the anticipated results in the host 
country. Whichever perspective is adopted, I have shown that the expectation 
that the adoption of foreign corporate governance models will naturally bring 
about an ‗ordering‘ effect in Asian countries has not materialised. It is only 
possible to determine the optimal regime for companies through first 
understanding how individual cultures, institutions and political environments 
have influenced the way they have developed. I conclude that the challenge for 
Asian countries is not to implement all or several of the aspects of the Anglo 
American corporate governance model, but to be selective and shape them as 
appropriate to their individual environments if their effectiveness as a tool of 
economic development is to be realised.   
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